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I. INTRODUCTION
Lance Helms was beaten to death by his father's girlfriend when he was two
and a half years old.' Almost immediately after Lance was born in 1992, he was
taken away from his parents, who had a long history of drug abuse,2 and was placed
with his aunt.3 He spent almost two years with her, and she sought to adopt him.
4
However, before the formal proceedings were completed, the Los Angeles County
dependancy court stepped in and reunited Lance with his father.5 Immediately after
Lance went to live with his father, his grandmother and aunt noticed Lance had a
number of bruises on his body when he came to visit them.6 They were so con-
cerned that they reported the suspected abuse to the county social agency
Although a social worker visited Lance, the worker could do nothing.8 Three weeks
later Lance was dead. 9
1. See Mark Gladstone, Child Abuse Victim's Legacy is ide of Bills Legislature: Lawmakers Try to Make
it Easier to Remove Children from Abusive Homes. But Some Caution that Family Sanctity Demands Limited
Interference., L.A. TIMES, June 1I, 1996, at A3 (describing how the tragic death of Lance Helms has spurred the
California Legislature into action).
2. See James Rainey, A Child Dies, and Legal System is Blamed Violence: Social Workers and Family
Members Say Courts Ignored Numerous Red Flags in Assigning Custody of Boy, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at
AI(reporting that Lance Helms was born to heroin addicted parents).
3. See Rainey, supra note 2, at AI.
4. Id.
5. See CAL. WELl. & INST. CODE § 16507 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998) (stating that family reunification
services shall be provided when a child is taken out of the home due to abuse or neglect).
6. See Rainey, supra note 2, at Al (reporting that Lance had a black eye the first time Lance's aunt went
to visit him after his father was given custody).
7. Id.
8. See 48 Hours (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 29, 1996) (detailing Lance's story and how the child
protection agency or Los Angeles County's Child protection agency might have prevented his death).
9. See Rainey, supra note 2, at Al (stating that Lance's father's live in girlfriend was charged with the
murder of Lance).
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Lance's death and the national attention it received spurred a legislative
stampede of child welfare reform bills in the 1996 and 1997 Legislative Session.10
Most of the resulting legislation made it easier for states to remove children from
their families.11 For example, during the 1996 Legislative Session, SB 1812 was
introduced by Senator Polanco which, if it had passed, would have expanded the list
of agencies allowed access to the Department of Justice's child abuse registry.'2 SB
1812 would have given those responsible for removing children from their homes
more efficient access to reports in the Child Abuse Central Index.13 Although SB
1812 failed passage,14 the move to expand access to the registry was taken up again
in the 1997 Legislative Session.1
5
II. LANCE'S LAW: A RESPONSE TO LANCE HELMS' DEATH
Child abuse and neglect is an increasing problem in California.16 Drug
epidemics, poverty, and the break-up of the nuclear family have contributed to the
increase in child abuse.' 7 Stories like that of Lance Helms have increased public
awareness of child abuse and placed pressure on the State to address child abuse
issues. 18
California responded to pressures over child abuse by creating mandatory
reporting laws for civil employees, as well as creating a central index to house child
abuse reports. 9 Reporting suspected child abuse is mandatory for employees
working in fields such as social welfare, healthcare, protective services, and edu-
cation.20 Once a report of child abuse is made, it is investigated by a child protective
10. See Gladstone, supra note 1, at A3 (listing the bills dealing with child welfare as a result of Lance
Helms' death).
11. Id.
12. See Jonathan Kerr, California: Legislature Tackles Flood of Child Abuse, Family Reunification, WEST
LEGAL NEWS, June 24, 1996, at Al (listing child welfare reform bills which were introduced in the California
Legislature during the 1996 Legislative session).
13. Id
14. See ASSEiBLY COMMrIrEEONPUBLIC SAFETY, COMMG-FEE ANALYSIS OF SB 644, at 2 (July 15, 1997)
(stating th.at AB 1812 failed passage in the 1996 Legislative Session because of legal concerns over the Child Abuse
Central Index, but that those concerns had been cleared up by the time the bill was reintroduced as SB 644 in the
1997 Legislative Session).
15. Id.
16. See Lynn Smith, Children's Aid System Gets Mixed Marks From Clients; Social Services: Parents and
Youths Say Agency Does Help Them. But it's Often Impersonal and Slow-moving., L.A. TIIEs, Feb, 27, 1996, at
Al (stating that child abuse has increased dramatically because of various social problems).
17. Id.
18. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (detailing the story of Lance Helms).
19. See Planned Parenthood v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 255, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363 (1986)
(stating that California's child abuse reporting laws were created to combat the victimization of children).
20. See CAL. PENALCODE § 11 166(a)-(e) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (explaining who must report suspected
child abuse); id. § 11165.7(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (stating who is considered a child care custodian under
California Penal Code § 11166); id. § 11166.2 (West 1992) (stating that persons required to report under California
Penal Code § 11166 must immediately call child protective services); id. § 11166.5(a) (West 1992) (detailing the
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agency, and the agency then decides if the report is unfounded or if it can be
substantiated.2 t If the agency determines that the report was not unfounded, then it
forwards a copy of its report to the Department of Justice.'
The Department of Justice retains an index of all reports of abuse made by the
child protective agency.' These reports are kept in California's Child Abuse
Central Index24 which is maintained by the Department of Justice.2 Reports are
gathered by child protective agencies and sent on to the Department of Justice after
the agency has investigated the allegations to determine their validity.26 Subsequent
access to the index is limited by statute to certain agencies and individuals who
request such access.27 The Department of Justice is responsible for handling
requests for child abuse information contained in the index and sending out those
reports when requested. 2 All states have faced increased reports of child abuse, and
all have some form of statutory scheme which regulates who must report suspected
child abuse, how reports are investigated, the maintenance of reports in a central
index, and who may have subsequent access to the reports.29
Chapters 842, 844, and 24, collectively labeled Lance's Law Child Safety
Reform Act of 1997 [hereinafter Lance's Law]," affect child abuse reporting in two
ways. First, Lance's Law expands the number of agencies that may receive child
abuse reports to include placement agencies that wish to inquire about relatives who
provide foster care as well as local child death review teams that investigate child
deaths.31 Furthermore, Lance's Law allows the Board of Prison Terms to subpoena
social workers testimony to validate child abuse reports filed with the child
protective agency.32 Supporters of Lance's Law advocate expanding the list of
procedure for reporting child abuse).
21. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11169 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (setting forth the procedure that a child
protective agency must follow when submitting a report to the Department of Justice).
22. Id.
23. See id. § 11 170(a)-(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (describing procedures for the Department of Justice
to follow in retaining that report).
24. See 65 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 335 (1982) (stating the Department of Justice will retain an index of all pre-
liminary reports that the child protective agency makes, and that the index will not contain any unfounded reports).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See id. § 11170(b)(3)-(4) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (explaining who may receive child abuse reports
from the index).
28. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11170 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (directing the Department of Justice to
maintain the Child Abuse Central Index).
29. See, e.g., Jill D. Moore, Comment, Charting a Course Between Scylla and Charybdis: Child Abuse
Registries and Procedural Due Process. 73 N.C. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (1995) (stating that all states now have some
form of statutory scheme for preventing child abuse, and that most states now have a central child abuse registry).
30. See Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 842, sec. 1, at 4692 (West) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.12,
11166.9, 11167.5, 11169, 11170, 11170.5) (declaring that Chapters 24, 842, and 844 should be know as Lance's
Law Child Safety Reform Act of 1997).
31. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11170 (amended by Chapter 844) (setting forth who may have access to the
Child Abuse Central Index).
32. Id. § 11167.5 (amended by Chapter 842 and 844).
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agencies receiving reports, arguing that these agencies need access to abuse reports
in order to better protect children.3"
Chapter 842 also affects how the Department of Justice maintains reports within
the Child Abuse Central (Index).34 Lance's Law sets up a scheme in which people
who are listed as abusers in the report can gain access to Index reports that concern
them. 35 This allows those people who no longer should be in the database to take
appropriate action and expunge that information from the Index.36 Furthermore, the
scheme allows data on victims who have reached an adult age to be expunged from
the Index.37 It also provides for mandatory purging of unfounded reports after a
certain period of time.38 This will increase the accuracy of the Index and provide
greater due process protection to those who are listed in it.31
II. LANCE'S LAW: EFFECTS ON CURRENT LAW
A. Child Placement Agencies' Access to the Child Abuse Central Index
When it is necessary to remove children from their homes and place them in
foster care, California gives preferential treatment to relatives wishing to care for
the child.40 Children placed with relatives versus traditional foster care families
make up almost half of all children placed in foster care.4 ' Relative foster care has
become a popular way for the state to reduce the cost of operating the foster care
system by shifting costs onto extended families.42 Relative foster care has a number
of other benefits for the children over traditional foster care, such as: (1) main-
taining the child's cultural environment; (2) smoothing the child's transition to
foster care; and (3) keeping the child's social network of family and friends stable. 3
33. See ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 1065, at 1-2 (May 21,
1997) (stating that the California Children's Lobby argues that protective agencies' inability to access the Child
Abuse Central Index has resulted in the placement of children in abusive homes).
34. See infra notes 60-127 and accompanying text (explaining how Lance's Law affects child reporting laws
in California).
35. ASSEMBLY COMImrrTrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 644, at (July 15, 1997).
36. Il
37. Id
38. Ld.
39. Id.
40. See ASSEMBLY COM/mrrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1065, at I (Apr. 2, 1997)
(explaining that California law prefers relatives over strangers when placing children in a foster home); see also
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.3(c)(2) (West Supp. 1998) (defining relative as a grandparent, aunt, uncle, or
sibling); Zd. § 361.2(0(1) (West Supp. 1998) (stating that children may be placed with relatives even outside the
county, but if the child is placed in foster care he must be placed in the same county as the parent); id. § 361.2(a)
(West Supp. 1998) (stating that relatives who wish to take care of the children will receive preferential treatment).
41. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMIT'EE ANALYSIS OF AB 1065, at 2 (July 8, 1997)
(stating that 45% of children removed from their home are placed with relatives).
42. See Alvin A. Rosenfeld, Foster Care: an Update, 36 J.A.C.A. 448, 450 (Apr. 1. 1997) (stating that
advocates of relative foster care believe it has significant advantages over traditional foster care).
43. Id. at451.
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However, it is important to note that relative foster care parents, unlike
traditional foster parents in California, are not licensed by the state. 4 Therefore, the
relative's fitness as a parent may be unknown to the child protective agency when
the agency places the child in the relative's care.4 Often, placement of a child must
be done quickly and the protective agency does not have the resources to fully
investigate the relative foster parents before placing the child in their care. This
means that the protective agency may unwittingly place children in unfit or abusive
homes.47
The child protective agencies have discretion to decide where to place the child,
even when there is a relative who wants to care for the child.4 In making this
decision, the child protective agency weighs a number of factors in determining
whether the relative foster parent will provide a suitable home for the child.4 9 In
helping the protective agency make this determination, the agencies typically relied
on reports from the Child Abuse Central Index.50 However, the Department of
Justice, after a lawsuit was filed against them, discovered that there was no statutory
authority enabling them to release information to placement agencies inquiring
about relative foster care providers. 51 The statute which sets forth the list of those
qualified to receive reports from the Department of Justice only allows these
agencies access to information about licensed foster care providers.52 Since child
abuse reports are subject to confidentiality laws, the Department of Justice stopped
providing abuse reports on relative foster care parents.53 Without access to these
reports, placement agencies are often forced to blindly place children with
44. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1065, at 2 (Apr. 2. 1997)
(stating that relatives who are willing to provide foster care are typically unlicenced).
45. See SENATE COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1065, at 3 (July 8, 1997)
(stating that because placement agencies cannot effectively evaluate relative foster care providers, this could have
a detrimental effect on the welfare of the child).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.3(a) (West Supp. 1998) (stating that when a relative wishes to care
for the children they will be considered first, but the ultimate decision is in the hands of the placement agency).
49. See id. § 361.3 (West Supp. 1998) (explaining that when making their decision, the placement agency
must consider the best interest of the child, the wishes of the parent, and the safety of the child).
50. See SENATE COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1065, at 2 (July 15, 1997)
(describing how child placement agencies decide with whom they will place a child).
51. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1065, at 2 (July 8, 1997)
(stating that the Department of Justice changed its procedure with regard to placement agency access to the Child
Abuse Central Index in 1995).
52. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11170(b)(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (stating that the Department of Justice
may provide information from the Index to placement agencies only for licenced foster care providers, or those
applying for a license to become a foster care provider).
53. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1065, at 2 (Apr. 2, 1997)
(stating that in November of 1995, the Department of Justice stopped providing reports on relatives to placement
agencies).
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relatives. This was a major concern of the Legislature in enacting Chapters 842,
844, and 24.55
Chapters 842, 844, and 24 ensure that placement agencies are able to obtain
information from the Child Abuse Cental Index on any person that has agreed to
care for the child in foster care placement. This includes access to any information
on unlicenced relatives who wish to take a child.56 There is a strong belief that
unless placement agencies have this access, they may place a child in a dangerous
situation.
Furthermore, Chapters 842, 844, and 24 provide that in emergency situations
the Department of Justice need not verify the report with the original reporting
agency before allowing access to child abuse reports by child placement agency
requesting the report." The Department of Justice implemented this procedure in
order to ensure that the reporting agency still had the report on file because the
Index system merely catalogs reports and does not maintain the full report.59 How-
ever, in situations where the need to place a child is of immediate concern, this
procedure has caused unwarranted delays.6 For instance, if a placement agency
needed to place a child on a weekend or holiday and the reporting agency was
closed, the placement agency would have to wait several days before the report
could be verified.6' Placement agencies typically do not have the resources to verify
the safety of a placement home without the use of the Index.62 Therefore, the Legis-
lature sought to reduce delays by allowing the Department of Justice to skip the
verification procedure when sending reports to placement agencies needing
emergency placement of a child.63
54. Id. at 2.
55. ld. at 2.
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11170(b) (amended by Chapter 842).
57. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
58. ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1065, at 2 (July 15, 1997);
see CAL. Civ. CODE § 1798.8 (West 1997) (requiring all government records to be accurate, relevant, timely, and
complets).
59. SeeASSEMBLYCOMMITrEEONPUBLICSAFETY,COMMT7FEEANALYSISOPAB 1065, at 3 (July 15,1997)
(stating that the Department of Justice's Child Abuse Central Index merely catalogs reports and does not maintain
a full copy of them).
60. See SENATE COmITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 644, at 7 (Apr. 8, 1997)
(describing situations where placing children in foster care has been delayed for several days).
61. Id
62. See SENATE RULES COMiTTEE, COMM=TTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1065, at 1 (Sept. 9, 1997) (stating that
local child placement agencies lack the tools to quickly evaluate the safety of relative placements).
63. See SENATE COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1065, at 2 (July 8, 1997)
(explaining that the verification procedure delayed placement of abused children).
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B. Child Death Review Teams' Access to the Child Abuse Index
Child death review teams have existed on the local level since 1978, when the
first child death review team was created in Los Angeles.' Since that time, almost
all states have created some form of child death review teams.65 The purpose of
these teams on a local level is to investigate child deaths.6 In doing so, the teams
coordinate the efforts of agencies responsible for criminal investigation, social
services, health and welfare services, and medical examiners.67 Prior to the creation
of the child death review teams, law enforcement, health agencies, and child welfare
agencies acted independently of each other, often filing reports containing duplicate
information. 8 Working together to form a team of law enforcement, child welfare,
and health agencies reduced redundant reporting and facilitated the sharing of infor-
mation about the case.69 This lead to more accurate reporting as to the actual cause
of death.70 Once the team reviewed the case and made its determination as to the
cause of death, it turned the case over to the appropriate agency to follow up on the
case if needed.71 For example, if the team decides that a child died at the hands of
a parent, the team will turn the case over to law enforcement officials with an72
appropriate recommendation. The recommendation of the child death review team
to law enforcement officials would be to either pursue an investigation or close the
case.
73
Child death review teams also exist on a state level.74 Ty)'pically, the goal of
statewide teams is to make statewide policy recommendations about child death
prevention based upon review of a large number of cases by local review teams.75
These statewide teams may also work to coordinate the efforts of local teams and
64. See Michael J. Durfee, Origins and Clinical Relevance of Child Death Review Teams, 267 JAMA 3172,
3173 (June 17, 1992) (discussing the purpose of child death review teams from their origins, and what all teams
should set out to accomplish).
65. U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, REPORT, A NATION'S SHAME: FATAL CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES, at 1 (copy on file with McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter
ADVISORY, A NATION'S SHAME].
66. See Durfee, supra note 64, at 3173.
67. Id. at3174.
68. Id
69. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166.7 (West 1992) (listing who may be on the child death review team).
70. See Durfee, supra note 64, at 3173 (explaining that in states that have established child death review
teams, the teams have been successful in reclassifying a number of deaths).
71. See ADVISORY, ANATION'S SHAME, supra note 65, at 5 (describing the procedure followed by a typical
child death review team).
72. See Durfee, supra note 64, at 3175 (stating how child death review teams interact with other agencies
investigating child deaths).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See ADVISORY, A NATION'S SHAME, supra note 65, at 4 (explaining the responsibilities of a statewide
child death review team).
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provide the protocol that local teams must follow in reviewing deaths. 76 In some
states, these teams also investigate individual cases, especially where no local team
exists. 77
In California, child death review teams have existed on the county level for
almost 30 years.78 Statewide coordination of child death review teams by the
Attorney General, working with state child abuse officials, came only after a num-
ber of counties already had established teams.7 9 Other states have taken a much
more active role in the creation of local child death review teams, making detailed
provisions for the agency representatives needed on the team, as well as the
protocol the team must follow in reviewing a child's death.8" For example, Arizona
has created a statutory scheme that specifies which local agency officials are to be
on the team, the scope of the team's duties, the local team's relationship to the
statewide team, and the access that local teams have to confidential reports. 8'
Missouri goes even further with its scheme.8
2
In Missouri a medical examiner or coroner must be the first to review all child
deaths. If they find the death has occurred under suspicious circumstances, they
must turn the case over to the child death review team.' The team must fill out a
standardized form on the child's death. 5 However, not all states have such elaborate
statutory schemes for child death review teams. Colorado's statewide child death
review team was created by state child protective agencies and health officials
deciding to work together to review child deaths within the state.8 6
76. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166.7(a)-(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (setting forth the state's protocol
for child death review teams).
77. See ADVIsORY, A NATION's SHA M supra note 65, at 4 (describing how Colorado's child death review
team works).
78. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (detailing the history of child death review teams).
79. See Durfee, supra note 64, at 3175 (stating that local teams had spread to almost every county before
California enacted a state team).
80. See infra notes 81-88 (discussing how Arizona and Missouri have handled the creation of local child
death review teams).
81. See ARIZ. REV.STAT.ANN.§ 36-3502(A)-(B) (West 1993) (stating that local teams must contain a county
medical examiner, an official from the child protective service, and an official from the health department in order
to receive state authorization to review child deaths); see also id. § 36-3502(C) (West 1993) (setting forth what
authorized local child fatality teams must do); id. § 36-3502(A) (West 1993) (requiring local fatality teams to follow
the protocol set by the state team); id. § 36-3503(A), (B), (D)-(F) (West 1993) (detailing the procedure for child
fatality teams obtaining records regarding the deceased child they are investigating).
82. See infra note 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing Missouri's scheme for child death review).
83. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 58.452(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1998) (stating that the when a child dies, the coroner
first must examine the child and then depending on the circumstances notify the chairman of the child fatality
review panel or file a "non suspicious" death form).
84. Id.
85. See id § 210.192(3) (West 1996) (requiring the local team to send a report on every death they review,
as well as a summary report form, to the Department of Social Services, State Technical Assistance Team, and
Department of Health).
86. ADVISORY, A NATION'S SHAME, supra note 65, at 4.
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Where child death review teams have been established, they have had success
in reclassifying a number of child deaths.8 7 In a number of cases they have
designated abuse as the cause of death, with the parents or guardians of the child
being the perpetrator.88 However, child death review teams have received some
criticism by those who believe that in some cases the teams go overboard with
investigations or are too quick to attribute the death to abuse and/or neglect in what
may have been an accidental or disease related death.89 Advocates of child death
review teams argue that a high number of child deaths at the hands of parents or
guardians are not reported as homicides."° This, they say, is because no one ever
suspects that bereaving parents are capable of murdering their own children.9t
Therefore, advocates argue that one of the easiest crimes to get away with is mur-
dering one's own child. 2
Child death review teams complain that the confidentiality reports associated93
with child abuse reporting hinder their investigations. TyFpically, state law does not
expressly provide that child death review teams have access to child abuse reports.94
In addition, the agency which houses the report may be confused about whether or
not it is authorized to give child abuse reports to the teams.95 Federal law, which
provides for block grants to state child abuse and neglect programs, makes
exceptions for child death review teams in the confidentiality requirements for state
programs. 96 These exceptions allow child death review teams access to reports made
by child welfare agencies to help the team review child deaths.97 California law
allows access to the Child Abuse Central Index to multi agency review teams
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Jody T. Thayer, The Latest Evidence for Shaken Baby Syndrome, 12 CRIM. JusT. 15, 16 (1997)
(quoting a child abuse attorney's remarks that child death review teams are made up of "zealots" who are too quick
to find a child has died of a homicide without proper support); see also Beverly Beyette, Stigma of SIDS:Is it
Sudden Infant Death, or is it Child Abuse? Grieving Parents Can Find Themselves Under Suspicion, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1990, at Al (reporting that in SIDS cases, child death review teams may go overboard in suspecting
parental abuse as the cause of death).
90. See Beyette, supra note 89, at Al (quoting Michael Durfee, who helped organize the first local child
death review team).
91. Durfee, supra note 64, at 3172.
92. Id. at3172.
93. See David Stoesz, Suffer the Children: How Government Fails its Most Vulnerable Citizens - Abused
and Neglected Kids, 28 WASH. MONTHLY 20, 22 (1996) (stating that confidentiality laws should not be used to
prevent child death review teams from investigating child deaths).
94. See ADvisoRY, A NATION'S SHAME, supra note 65, at 8 (explaining how confidentiality laws and denial
of access to child abuse reports has hindered investigations by child death review teams).
95. Id.
96. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(i)(2)(i) (1997) (setting forth the confidentiality requirements for states to
receive block grants for child abuse and neglect prevention); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1340.20 (1997) (stating that all
state programs that receive funding under the Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Program must be in compliance
with the confidentiality requirements of the act).
97. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(i)(2)(i) (1997) (stating that confidentiality laws hinder child death review teams
from receiving information on child deaths); see also ADvisoRy, A NATION'S SHAME, supra note 65, at 5 (stating
that Federal government statues relating to confidentiality make exceptions for child death review teams).
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investigating child abuse.98 However, the Department of Justice, which controls the
Index, no longer allows local child death review teams access to the Index.9 This
has hindered the effectiveness of review teams who use information of past child
abuse in order to help determine if a suspicious child death was caused by abuse.t(
C. Lance's Law Smooths the Path for Child Death Review Teams
Lance's Law addresses child death review teams in two ways.' 0' First, it
eliminates the confidentiality requirements that barred child death review teams'
access to files on reported child abusers." These confidentiality requirements
forbid any agent reporting child abuse from disclosing information contained in the
report to unauthorized sources. 03 Lance's Law allows child death review teams
investigating the death of a child access to any child abuse reports relating to the
deceased child, the deceased child's siblings, or the suspects that are in the Child
Abuse Central Index.0 4
Furthermore, Lance's Law permits child death review teams access to reports
of alleged child abuse that social, medical, and protection agency workers are
required to make when they suspect a child is being abused. 0 5 Child death review
teams may share this information along with other information they have gathered
from other child death review teams.' °6 By making information contained in child
abuse reports and the Child Abuse Central Index available to local child death
review teams, the Legislature hopes to make child death review teams better able
to prevent further child deaths." 7
98. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166.9 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998).
99. See SENATE COMMTTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMITEE ANALYSiS OF SB 644, at 2 (Apr. 2, 1997)
(explaining that in 1995, after several lawsuits on the matter, the Department of Justice stopped supplying
information to child death review teams).
100. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 98-100, infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text (explaining why child death review
teams were not allowed access to child abuse reports and what Lance's Law now allows child death review teams
access to).
102. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11 170(b)(4) (amended by Chapter 844) (granting access to confidential child
abuse reports to child death review teams).
103. See id. § 11167.5 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (propounding the confidentiality and disclosure
requirements of child abuse reports).
104.. See id. § 11170 (amended by Chapter 844) (enunciating the scope of child abuse reporting information
to which child death review teams are granted access).
105. Id.
106. See AsSEMBLY CoMMIrTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, CMMiTTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 644, at 3 (July 15, 1997)
(explaining that Chapter 842 will allow child death review teams to share information with other teams); see also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11167.5(b)(14) (amended by Chapter 844) (allowing child death review teams to share
information related to child deaths).
107. See SENATE Com.iMrrrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 644, at 2 (Apr. 8, 1997)
(explaining that access to the Child Abuse Central Index is necessary for child death review teams to prevent the
death of the siblings of the deceased child).
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Lance's Law also creates a Child Death Review Council. 08 This Council will
review child death reports on a statewide basis in order to make recommendations
about how to better coordinate the efforts of local child death review teams."'9 The
Council is also charged with disseminating preventive information to the public to
curb future child deaths and track trends in child deaths within the state.1 ° A
number of child death review advocates believe that state level coordination of local
teams will make for more complete child death reviews.' 1
However, the Child Death Review Council is little more than a label the Legis-
lature has given to the Department of Justice working in conjunction with social,
health, medical, and child protective agencies overseeing child death prevention
issues."2 Most child abuse prevention issues were previously handled by the same
collective group of agencies." 3 The Legislature has declared that these agencies
must share information contained within their database concerning child abuse
statistics and its reports with the other agencies represented in the Child Death
Review Council." 4 This Legislative directive will eliminate confusion about how
the Department of Justice relates to other child welfare agencies, and it will help to
increase the accuracy and scope of child death prevention information that the
Department of Justice produces." 5
D. Board of Prison Terms' Access to the Child Abuse Central Index
Before Chapter 24 was enacted, the Board of Prison Terms 116 was allowed to
use filed reports of child abuse during parole violation hearings." 7 However, this
proved to be unmanageable in many cases because these reports had limited value
in proving a parole violation due to child abuse and they contained information that
108. See CAL PENALCODE § 11166.9(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 842) (establishing a Child Death Review
Council); see also SENATE COMMITTEE ON ThE JUDICiARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 644, at 3 (Apr. 8. 1997)
(stating that Chapter 842 will create a Child Death Review Council).
109. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11 166.9(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 842) (setting forth the responsibilities and
duties of the Child Death Review Council).
110. lit
111. See ADvIsmRY, A NATION's SHAME. supra note 65, at 4 (describing how a number of states have a state
child death review team that coordinates with local teams).
112. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 11170 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (setting forth the responsibilities of
the Department of Justice and other agencies related to child welfare) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 11170 (amended
by Chapter 842 and 844) (outlining the same functions for the Department of Justice, working with other agencies,
as prior law had outlined).
113. See UL § 11 166.9(e)-(f) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (outlining what the Department of Justice, working
with other agencies, may do to prevent child deaths and abuse).
114. Id. § 11166.9(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 844).
115. See ADVISORY, A NATION'S SHAME, supra note 65, at 5 (explaining the benefits of having a Child Death
Review Council at the state level).
116. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11167.5(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (explaining that the Board of Prison
Terms is responsible for pursuing parol violations).
117. See id. § 11 167.5(b)(9) (amended by Chapter 24) (maintaining that the Board of Prison Terms may
subpoena child abuse reports to the extent that they are relevant).
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needed clarification."1 ' When the Board of Prison Terms attempted to substantiate
the reports, it needed to request that the social worker who wrote the report come
forward and testify." 9 However, the Board was usually rebuffed by the social
worker who believed that confidentiality laws prohibited the disclosure of infor-
mation on the report.120 Therefore, the Board could not meet its burden of proof in
demonstrating that the parolee had committed a crime and should be put back in
jail. 12
1
Chapter 24 increases the usefulness of child abuse reports during a parole
violation hearing." Specifically, Chapter 24 permits the Board of Prison terms to
subpoena the child protective agency workers who filed the report.'23 These workers
should be able to clarify any ambiguities in the report which should help the Board
of Prison Terms meet its burden of proof requirements.'24 Without the ability to
subpoena these workers, the Board of Prison terms had difficulty in incarcerating
those parolees who violated their parole by committing child abuse."z The con-
fidentiality requirement cited by child protection workers will no longer be
infringed upon in these cases since the workers will merely verify reports that the
Board of Prison Terms are already allowed to subpoena.'
26
E. Access to the Child Abuse Index by Those Whose Names are Listed Within It
The Child Abuse Central Index has been maintained for over 30 years, and in
that time has listed a large number of reports on both accused abusers and
victims. 27 These reports are labeled and maintained using a three tiered system.'
Reports that are found to be true are maintained permanently in the Index.
29
Reports that are inconclusive, but not unfounded, are also maintained permanently
118. See SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1536, at I (Apr. 20, 1997)
(explaining why child abuse reports alone are not enough to prosecute a parolee).
119. Id.
120. See id at 2 (stating that the author of the report usually refuses to testify).
121. Id. (explaining that without the opportunity to clarify the child abuse report, the hearing officer may have
trouble meeting the preponderance of the evide-nce standard).
122. Id.
123. See id. § 111 67.5(b)(9) (amended by Chapter 24, 842, and 844) (explaining that the Board of Prison
Terms may subpoena a child protective worker to explain their report).
124. See supra note 118 (expounding on the reasons why the Board of Prison Terms needs to verify with
testimony in court child abuse reports).
125. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (stating the problems that the Board of Prison Terms
has in convicting parolees of child abuse)
126. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11167.5 (Vest 1997) (stating that disclosure to an unauthorized person is a
misdemeanor); id. (allowing the Board of Prison Terms to subpoena child abuse reports for use at trial).
127. See ASSEmLY COrNITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1065, at 3 (Apr. 2, 1997)
(explaining the history of the Child Abuse Central Index).
128. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.12(a)-(c) (explaining that child abuse reports have three labels,
"substantiated," "unsubstantiated," and "unfounded").
129. See 65 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 335,336 (1982) (establishing time periods regarding when and if reports
are to be erased).
634
McGeorge Law Review / VoL 29
in the Index. 10 While these reports are inconclusive, there currently is no time limit
requiring reports to be removed. 31 Reports found to be false are regularly expunged
from the Index.
132
Under prior law, when a report was sent to the Department of Justice for
placement in the Index, the Department of Justice was not required to inform the
accused or the victim that their name appears in the index. 33 Furthermore, there was
no administrative procedure for the removal of a person's name from the Index.'3
Those who wished to have their name removed, whether they were the victims or
the accused, needed to obtain a judicial decree that their name must be removed
from the Index.135 This process was time consuming and was hampered by the fact
that those listed in the Index could not access reports in the Index, to verify what
information if any reports contained about them.
36
Lance's Law offers some relief to those who wish to have their names removed
from the Index.137 First, it requires the Department of Justice to notify those who are
to be placed in the Index. Specifically, the Department of Justice must send a letter
stating which reporting agency filed the report.138 This may make it easier for those
whose names are in the Index to track down the agency making the report and to
contest its findings. 139 However, this does not include people who were placed in
the Index prior to the enactment of Lance's Law. Second, it sets out a procedure for
people who are in the Index to obtain the relevant report in which they are named.14'
The information they receive may be helpful to those who wish to contest the report
in the Index.
Furthermore, Lance's Law provides for the removal of reports that are incon-
clusive after a ten year period.141 Reports of abuse that have been found to have
merit, but are not conclusive as to whether there was abuse, will be removed from
the Index if no other reports of abuse are filed about the accused. 142 This increases
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ONTHE JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 644, at 2 (July 16, 1997)
(explaining that under then-existing law, no notice was given to those in the index).
134. See SENATE COmmITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 644, at 3 (Apr. 8, 1997)
(explaining how a person must go about removing his name from the Index).
135. Id. at 3.
136. Id.
137. See AsSEMLYCOMMITrEEONPUBLICSAFETY, CoMMFFEEANALYSISOFSB 644, at I (July 15,1997)
(explaining that Lance's Law will also allow people listed on the index a means of having their names removed
from the list, especially in those cases were the victim wishes his name removed).
138. CAL. PENAL CODE §11170(b) (amended by Chapter 842).
139. See ASSEMBLYCOMMITTEEONPUBLICSAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 644, at 1 (July 15, 1997)
(stating that Chapter 842 will make it easier for people to have their names removed from the Child Abuse Central
Index).
140. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11170(b) (amended by Chapter 24).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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the accuracy of the Index and ensures that it remains updated.143 Finally, Lance's
Law allows victims to request removal of their names from the Index when they
become an adult.' 44 The Legislature has found that the name of the abused serves
no purpose once the victim has become an adult, and the name should be removed
if requested by the victim. 4
5
IV. DuE PROCESS ISSUES
Whenever a state action may infringe on an individual's protected liberty or
property interest, the state must set up procedural safeguards that meet the
Fourteenth Amendment's requirements." The Supreme Court has established a two
part test to determine whether a state's action violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. 47 First, the Court decides if there is a substantive right such
as a protected liberty or property interest which the state action infringes upon.' 41
The Court then looks at the individual's interest in the substantive right and the
possibility that their interest will be erroneously deprived because of insufficient
procedural requirements. 49 The Court balances this against the state's interest, the
availability of alternative procedures that would reduce the likelihood of error, and
the burden on the state to implement those alternative procedures. 50 If the balance
weighs in favor of the individual, then the court will find that the individual was
deprived of due process, but if the balance weighs in favor of the state, then the
individual has been given the required due process.' 5 '
A. Is a Substantive Right Violated?
Historically, people have had a protected liberty interest in the preservation of
their family privacy and the right to raise their family as they see fit.'52 They also
143. See SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE FISCAL SUMMARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 644, at I
(May 12, 1997) (stating that 45,000 records will be deleted under Chapter 842, increasing the accuracy and
efficiency of the index).
144. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11170(0 (added by Chapter 842).
145. See SENATE COMMIrTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 644, at 6-7 (Apr. 8, 1997)
(explaining that although maintaining the victim's names in the Index is useful when they are children, its
usefulness is negated when the victim becomes an adult).
146. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2 (stating that no citizen can be deprived of life, liberty, or property by
a state without due process of law).
147. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 326 (1972).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 319.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (explaining that preventing termination of parent/
child bond is an important liberty interest); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (recognizing that
freedom of choice in family matters is an important liberty interest); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566-
70 (1972) (limiting the scope of protected interests in state created rights); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
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have a protected liberty interest in maintaining their reputation if detriment to that
reputation will affect other liberty interests. 153 Whether these liberty interests are
infringed upon by California's maintenance of a Child Abuse Central Index is
debatable.154 California's child abuse registry law has not been questioned in the
courts as to whether it violates the Fourteenth Amendment. However, similar child
abuse registries in others states have been challenged with mixed results. 55
Courts have differed on whether registration in a child abuse index infringes on
family privacy. 56 In Bohn v. County of Dakota,'57 the court held that being
registered as a suspected child abuser in a state child abuse registry infringed on the
family privacy and reputation interests of the individual. 58 However, in Hodge v.
Jones,t59 another court held that merely being listed in the states child abuse registry
was not enough to invade upon the individual's right to family privacy.'6 Further-
more, the court reasoned that confidentiality laws ensure that the information in the
database would not spread to the community.' 6' Both these cases turned on how
broadly the court defined the family interest in remaining free from government
interference and how invasive the court found the state action. 62
Whether Lance's Law is found to infringe on family privacy by creating greater
access to child abuse reports will turn on how invasive the court views registry in
the Index and how broadly the court interprets family privacy. 63 In Hodges, the
court limited the scope of family privacy interests to instances where the family
wanted to prevent disclosure of private information, and to prevent state inter-
ference with important family decisions, such as: (1) punishment of the child; (2)
education of the child; and (3) how the child is brought up."" Furthermore, the court
found that being registered in a child abuse index did not directly affect family
privacy. 65 The court in Bohn, however, reasoned that an individual being registered
in a child abuse index directly affected the family."6
(1923) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to raise children).
153. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699 (1976) (holding that unfavorable public stigma of an individual
created by a state action alone is not enough to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Some other right must be
infringed upon as well).
154. Id.
155. Moore, supra note 29, at 2065.
156. Id. at 2066.
157. 772 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
158. Bohn, 772 F.2d at 1435.
159. 31 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 (1994).
160. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 168.
161. Id. at 159.
162. Id. at 168.
163. Id. at 160.
164. See Nicholas Stavlas, Note, Confidential Maintenance of Unsubstantiated Child Abuse Investigation
Reports and the Scope of Familia Privacy, 54 MD. L. REV. 1005, 1006-07 (1995) (describing how one family's
privacy was invaded by child welfare authorities).
165. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 161.
166. Bohn, 772 F.2d at 1437.
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Lance's Law may increase the invasiveness of California's child welfare system
into family privacy. t67 Lance's Law expands prior law by allowing greater access
to the child abuse index. 163 The use of those reports by child placement agencies and
child death review teams to conduct possibly intrusive investigations that may
invade the sanctity of the family could be found to violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.169 However, the Hodge court reasoned that speculation of increased state
intrusion, because a member of the family is registered in a child abuse database,
is not by itself enough to invade family privacy.1
70
B. Procedural Due Process
If a court determines that Lance's Law infringes on the protected liberty interest
of family privacy, then the court will determine if the state has met the burden of
providing procedural due process. ' 7 'The Supreme Court in Mathews v Eldridge,72
set out a balancing test to decide if the state meets this burden.'73 The Court in
Eldridge balanced the interest of the individual in the protected right against the
state's interest. 74 The Court also balanced the possibility that procedural error
would lead to improper decisions against the burden on the state to provide an
alternative procedural process.
75
When applying the balancing test in Eldridge to the changes made in
California's registry law by Chapters 842, 844, and 24, it is possible that the
changes made shift the balance in favor of finding that the registry satisfies the due
process requirement. First, Chapters 842, 844, and 24 make the registry more
accurate by allowing unsubstantiated reports to be removed from the registry after
ten years.' 76 This helps to limit the possibility that an agency using information in
the registry will improperly interfere in the affairs of a family based on false
information from the registry. 77 This would result in reducing the possibility that
an individual's protected family interest will be infringed upon due to procedural
errors. 178
167. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing how Lance's Lau, expands who may look at child
abuse reports).
168. Id.
169. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (describing how invasive some child welfare agencies such
as a child death review team can be).
170. Hodge, 31 E3d at 160.
171. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 325 (1976).
172. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
173. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 324.
174. Id. at 328.
175. Id. at 329.
176. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
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Second, Chapters 842 and 844 give victims an avenue of redress for expunging
unsubstantiated reports filed in the index. 179 This provides an individual with greater
procedural due process before the state interferes with his rights.18 Furthermore, by
expunging unsubstantiated reports, the accuracy of the Index is increased even
more.1"' Chapters 842 and 844 lessen the accuracy in reporting for the Department
of Justice when a child placement agency is seeking information on an individual
the agency wishes to place a child with in an emergency situation.18 2 However,
since this would only happen in emergency situations where the burden on the state
to find a suitable home for the child is high, this provision probably does not
adversely effect the balancing test.183
V. CONCLUSION
Chapters 842, 844, and 24 expand access to the Child Abuse Central Index.18
4
Whenever more people have access to sensitive information such as that contained
in a child abuse report, there is always a possibility that information may be leaked
and become public knowledge. 85 However, reports that are unsubstantiated may be
helpful to a child protective agency's investigations. 8 6 A number of unsubstantiated
reports on one individual may point to a pattern of child abuse that the agency may
wish to follow up, or the reports will make the agency dealing with the child aware
of a possible danger to the child's safety.'87 However, when unsubstantiated infor-
mation is leaked to the public it does little but damage the reputation of a person
who may have been falsely accused.'88
The Legislature has addressed concerns over inaccurate reports within the Child
Abuse Cental Index in Chapters 842 and 844.289 By allowing individuals who are
named as abusers in unsubstantiated reports on the index access to the information
and a means of having that information erased, Lance's Law has increased the
179. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text (discussing the problems agencies face in placing children
in decent homes).
184. See supra notes 30-145 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of Chapter 24, 842, and 844 on
the Child Abuse Central Index).
185. See generally Rothman v. Jackson, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1134, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284 (1996) (stating that a
child abuse report was leaked to the press).
186. See Joni Jones, Note, Maintaining Unsubstantiated Records of "Suspected" Child Abuse: Much Ado
About Nothing or a Violation of the Right to Privacy?, 1995 UTAH L. REv 887, 895-96 (1995) (stating that several
reports for one child may warrant investigation).
187. Id.
188. See Rothman v. Jackson, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1134, 1138, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284, 287 (1996) (recounting
the negative press that celebrity Michael Jackson received do to a leaked child abuse report).
189. See supra notes 124-45 and accompanying text (explaining the accuracy problems that may exist in the
Child Abuse Central Index and what the Legislature has done to address these issues).
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accuracy of the child abuse reporting system.190 However, the legislature has
increased the possibility that this sensitive information may be leaked to the public
by allowing greater access to it.
640
190. See supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text (describing how Lance's Law affects individuals who
wish to remove their name from the Child Abuse Central Index).
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Eliminating the Use of Civil Compromise in Cases of
Domestic Violence, Elder Abuse, and Child Abuse
J. Cross Creason
Code Sections Affected
Penal Code § 1377 (amended).
SB 97 (Alpert); 1997 STAT. Ch. 243
I. INTRODUCTIO1
An act can give rise to both criminal and civil liability.' However, privately
settling civil claims arising out of a crime will not ordinarily bar a prosecution
because a crime is by definition a public wrong and a breach of the "public rights
and duties, due to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social
aggregate capacity.",2 Some states, however, in cases of minor offenses allow for
"civil compromise," whereby criminal liability may be avoided if the civil claim
arising out of the purported offense is settled to the satisfaction of the victim.3 In
1. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 26 (1976).
2. 4WLLAMBLAcKsToNE, COMMENTARIES *5; see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINALLAW
1-2 (2d ed. 1995) (asserting that crimes, more than just harming private parties, involve a "social harm" to the whole
society); id. (arguing that it is the stigma and social condemnation accompanying criminal conviction that most
distinguishes it from civil judgment); see also Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) (arguing that what is done to people convicted of crimes, with the exception of the death
penalty, cannot be used to distinguish them from "unsuccessful defendants in civil proceedings"); id. at 404 n.10
(noting the similarity between criminal sanctions and civil sanctions such as institutionalization of insane persons
and punitive money damages); LEO KArz, BAD AcTS AND GuILTY MINDS 28 (1987) (asserting that the difference
between civil penalties and the punishment associated with a criminal conviction is that "the punishment condemns,
the penalty does not"); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 190 (1981) (stating that while condonation or settlement
with a criminal may bar civil damages, generally the state is not prevented from proceeding with prosecution); id.
(noting that a victim who agrees not to inform or prosecute a perpetrator in return for a bribe or settlement may be
guilty of the offense of compounding a crime).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1377 (West 1982) (amended by Chapter 243) (providing authority for courts
to compromise misdemeanors for which the victim has a civil action); see also People v. Stephen, 182 Cal. App.
3d Supp. 14, 27, 227 Cal. Rptr. 380, 388 (1986) (declaring that the legislative intent behind the civil compromise
statute is not to insure maximum compensation for the victim, rather the purpose is to remove from criminal
prosecution those cases where the public is best served by requiring the accused to make restitution directly to the
victim instead of subjecting him to criminal sanctions for the general welfare of society); Holsey v. State, 61 S.E.
836, 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) (reversing a conviction for driving a horse without consent of the owner because of
ratification by the owner, who gave the defendant a choice of a whipping or buying the horse, which defendant
chose to buy, on the theory that this manifested an acquiescence that related back to the event, removing the element
of non-consent); id. (confining the ruling to cases where the offense involves no crime against society or good
morals and only when the crime and agreement involve redress of private wrongs).
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addition to providing compensation to victims,4 civil compromise checks the great
discretionary power of the police and the prosecutor in deciding whether to arrest
and prosecute.5 Civil compromise also furthers administrative efficiency by re-
solving relatively minor disputes and eliminating the need for both civil and
criminal proceedings.6
Chapter 243,' which eliminates the availability of civil compromise in mis-
demeanor cases of domestic violence, elder abuse, and child abuse, distinguishes
between misdemeanors which are appropriate for civil compromise and those which
are not.8 In cases where the Legislature has not expressly excluded the availability
of civil compromise for specific crimes, California courts have performed a similar
line-drawing role by exercising their discretionary power to allow or disallow a civil
compromise. 9 Courts have identified three main factors for determining the
appropriateness of civil compromise for particular misdemeanors in the absence of
specific statutory language: (1) Whether the civil injury and the criminal violation
correspond; (2) whether the public injury is fully vindicated by the settlement; and
(3) whether the victim's settlement agreement is truly voluntary t0 Applying these
4. See CAL PENAL CODE § 1378 (West 1982) (requiring the injured person to acknowledge receiving
satisfaction for the injury before the court can grant a civil compromise); see also People v. Stephen, 182 Cal. App.
3d Supp. 14, 27, 227 Cal. Rptr. 380, 388 (1986) (stating that the public interest is best served in cases where civil
compromise is appropriate by "requiring the accused to make restitution directly and immediately to the individual
victim instead of subjecting him to criminal sanctions for the welfare of society in general").
5. See People v. Tischman, 35 Cal. App. 4th 175, 180,40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 653 (1995) (quoting the case
of State ex rel. Fitch v. Roxbury Dist. Court, 629 P. 2d 1341, 1343 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981), which stated that a "trial
court's impartial judgment in determining whether to dismiss the charge when based upon restitution to the victim
can bring to tear many factors important in the furtherance ofjustice which are not within the purview of the police
and prosecutor").
6. ishman, 35 Cal. App. 4th at 178, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652.
7. Chapter 243, eliminating civil compromise for misdemeaor domestic violence, child abuse, and elder
abuse, which amends California Penal Code § 1377, incorporates the language previously enacted by SB 115
(Burton), which eliminated civil compromise only in cases ofdomestic violence. Where relevant, reference is made
to docuraents pertaining to SB 115.
8. See 15A AM. Jui. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 26 (1976) (noting that compromise is usually
available only for minor offenses and many statutes only allow compromise in misdemeanor cases): see also
Elizabeth Fernandez, Domestic Violence Law May Get Tougher, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 14, 1997, at A8 (quoting
State Senator Burton, author of SB 115, as stating that civil compromise was meant to deal with property crimes
such as forgery or bicycle theft and not things like domestic violence); Elizabeth Fernandez, Supervisors Toughen
Stance AgainstAbuse, S.F. EXANITNER, Jan. 19, 1996, at AS [hereinafter Fernandez, Supervisors Toughen Stance]
(reporting that the San Francisco County Board of Supervisors committee approved a resolution disapproving of
judges' use of civil compromise in domestic violence cases).
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1378 (West 1982) (providing that discharge from criminal prosecution is within
the discretion of the court provided certain preconditions exist).
10. See People v. Moulton, 131 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 10, 21-23, 182 Cal. Rptr. 761, 767-68 (identifying
elements to be used by the trial court in determining whether to grant a civil compromise); id. at 23, 182 Cal, Rptr.
at 768 (stating that the seriousness of the injury to the victim and the factual circumstances of the offense are to be
considered in deciding whether civil compromise adequately vindicates the harm to the public); see also 7shman,
35 Cal. App. 4th at 181, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654 (rejecting the strict requirement of "full congruence" between civil
and crim-nal elements and requiring only that the "civil cause ofaction share[ ] a common element with the criminal
offense").
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factors to the crime of misdemeanor hit-and-run, for example, California courts
have differed over whether the criminal element of leaving the scene of an accident
corresponds to a civil injury and over whether the public injury is compensated by
a civil compromise."
Critics of circumstances when civil compromise was allowed by judges in
domestic violence cases saw a conflict between the goals and limiting principles
behind civil compromise and the fact that it was permitted by statute and was being
used in domestic abuse cases.' 2 Specifically, proponents of Chapter 243 felt that
judges in San Francisco were treating domestic violence as merely a private injury
rather than a serious crime by allowing civil compromise in approximately 20% of
misdemeanor domestic violence cases.13 In addition to the reaction against the over-
use of civil compromise, supporters of Chapter 243 fear that the settlements would
often not result from voluntary agreements.
14
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Eliminating civil compromise in domestic abuse cases comes during a period
of increased awareness of the issue and after a series of legislative efforts to bring
11. See People v. O'Rear, 220 Cal. App. 2d 927.931,34 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 (1963) (requiring that the civil
injury be co-extensive with the criminal violation and holding that because the crime of hit-and-run is not complete
until the accused has fled, it is not co-extensive with the property damage suffered by the victim); see also People
v. McWhinney, 206 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 8, 12,254 Cal. Rptr. 205,207 (1988) (holding that misdemeanor hit-and-
run is not appropriate for civil compromise because the injury to the public in the form of higher insurance
premiums resulting from hit and run is not compensated for by the civil compromise). But see 7Tschman, 35 Cal.
App. 4th at 177,40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652 (holding that misdemeanor hit-and-run, resulting in property damage alone,
is a proper subject for civil compromise); id. at 181 n.4, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654 n.4 (stating that a court would have
discretion to reject civil compromise in a misdemeanor hit-and-run case if there were extenuating circumstances,
for example, if law enforcement resources were used to track down the defendant).
12. See Greg Lucas, Assembly OKs Tougher Abuse Bill, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 12, 1996, at A17 (quoting the
coordinator of the San Francisco Violence Consortium as saying that for years the message that domestic violence
is a crime was promoted and that civil compromise, which amounts to an apology, is not appropriate for a crime);
see also Judges Accused of Leniency in Beatings, SAN DiEGo UNION-TRIB., Jan. 14, 1996, at A3 (quoting member
of the San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation as saying that for years there was a fight to get
the police to treat domestic violence as a crime, but that now judges, by using civil compromise too liberally, are
treating domestic violence as a civil matter rather than as a crime).
13. See ASSEMBLY COMMrrrE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 115, at 3 (Apr. 1, 1997)
(stating that the impetus for SB 115 was the high incidence of civil compromise in domestic abuse cases in San
Francisco); see also Fernandez, supra note 8, at A8 (reporting a study by the Family Violence Project showing that
civil compromise was used in San Francisco domestic violence cases 147 times over a 21 month period beginning
in 1994, and that no other county surveyed used the remedy in more than one case).
14. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrITEE ANALYSIs OF SB 97, at I (July 8, 1997)
(asserting that abusers could take advantage of their close relationship to the victim and that the settlement would
be the result of undue influence by the abuser); id. at 3 (arguing that because child and elder abuse statutes are
premised on the inability of frail individuals to make informed decisions there can be no consent to the abuser's
crime).
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such cases to adjudication.'5 For example, in 1995, California terminated pre-trial
diversion as an option in domestic violence cases.t 6 Moreover, several jurisdictions
in California have implemented "no-drop" policies which restrict the ability of
domestic violence victims to withdraw a complaint and limit the discretion of
prosecutors to drop charges when the victim is unwilling to participate in the
prosecution. 7
A. Before Chapter 243
Prior to Chapter 243, civil compromise was unavailable for certain mis-
demeanors.' 8 Reflecting the judgement that civil compromise should have limited
application in domestic violence cases,' 9 civil compromise was only available under
certain conditions, such as the accused could not have compromised a domestic
violence case within the previous seven years.20
15. See Angela Corsilles, Note, No Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases:
Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 853 (1994) (describing a "veritable
explosion in the number of laws enacted to combat the problem of woman battering" in the past fifteen years).
16. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 641, sec. 2. at 3965 (West) (repealing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000.6-
1000.11) (eliminating pre-trial diversion, which allowed for avoidance ofa criminal conviction conditioned upon
completion ofa counseling program, as an option for misdemeanor domestic violence offenses); id. sec. 1, at 3965
(West) (finding that domestic violence is a serious and widespread crime and that diversion is inadequate to address
domestic violence as a serious crime, although diversion programs are sometimes effective).
17. See Corsilles, supra note 15, at 858-64 (discussing generally "no-drop" policies, including imple-
mentation in California jurisdictions); id. at 864 (stating that although California has not adopted legislation
specifically urging "no-drop" policies, California Code of Civil Procedure § 1219 does implicitly recognize local
use of such policies by according victims special treatment when they refuse to testify); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1219(c) (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting incarceration following finding of contempt for a victim of domestic
violence who refuses to testify, but allowing the court to require counseling or community service, and allowing
incarceration after subsequent finding of contempt for refusal to testify arising out of the same case).
18. See CAL PENAL CODE § 1377(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting civil compromise when tle mis-
demeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer in the course of his or her duties, when the misdemeanor is
committed riotously, and when it is committed with the intent to commit a felony); 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 475, sec. 1,
at 1861 (West) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1377) (prohibiting compromise of a misdemeanor committed in
violation of any court order described in California Penal Code § 273.6).
19. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 219, sec. 219, at 1420-21 (West) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1377)
(providing that civil compromise of violations of § 6211 of the California Family Code or subdivision (b) of §
13700 of the Penal Code are subject to certain conditions ); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (a)-(t) (West 1994)
(defining "domestic violence" as abuse committed against a spouse or former spouse; a cohabitant or former
cohabitant; a person with whom the respondent has or has had an engagement or dating relationship; a person with
whom the respondent has had a child; "a child of a party or a child who is the subject of an action under the
Uniform Parentage Act, where the presumption applies that the male parent is the father of the child to be
protected"; or "any other person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree").
20. See 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 475, sec. 1, at 1861 (West) (amending CAL PENAL CODE § 1377) (prohibiting
civil compromise of domestic violence cases when the defendant had previously compromised a domestic violence
case with any victim within seven years of the current offense and requiring, upon objection by the prosecution to
the proposed compromise, a hearing at which the victim acknowledged and presented proof of satisfaction for the
injury); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3981 (West 1989) (allowing civil compromise in cases where the
defendant is accused of an act involving assault, threatening, or intimidating, or is accused of a misdemeanor
domestic violence offense only upon recommendation of the prosecuting attorney); IDAHO CODE § 19-3401 (1987)
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Seeking to deter future abuse, prior law required that the person accused of
certain domestic violence offenses attend counseling as part of the compromise."
Moreover, even if a crime is not expressly limited in its availability to civil com-
promise by statute and even though California law does not require the approval of
the prosecuting attorney as in some states,' a court may use its discretion and deny
granting civil compromise in particular situations.'
B. Chapter 243
Recognizing the inappropriateness of civil compromise in domestic violence
cases, Chapter 243 removes the conditional availability of civil compromise and
completely eliminates civil compromise in misdemeanor domestic violence cases.
24
Chapter 243 also prohibits civil compromise in cases of misdemeanor elder abuse
because the same dangers exist in these situations.25 Chapter 243 does not explicitly
(providing for civil compromise of misdemeanor cases unless committed by or upon a peace officer, riotously, or
with intent to commit a felony, but with no specific qualifications for cases of misdemeanor domestic violence).
21. See 1993-94 Cal. Legis. Serv., First Ex. Sess., ch. 35, sec. 1, at 3964 (West) (amending CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1377(e)) (providing that the court shall require defendants entering into civil compromise of a domestic
violence case, as defined in § 6211 of the California Family Code or § 13700 of the California Penal Code, to attend
a batterer's program of not less than eight hours).
22. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3981 (West 1989) (requiring the recommendation of the prosecuting
attorney for civil compromise in cases where the defendant is accused of a violent misdemeanor).
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1378 (providing that a court, in its discretion, "may" allow for civil
compromise); see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing the abuse of discretion standard used
in reviewing grants of civil compromise).
24. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1377(e) (amended by Chapter 243) (prohibiting civil compromise when a
misdemeanor is committed by or upon any family member or upon any person when the violation involves a person
described in § 6211 of the California Family Code or subdivision (b) of § 3700 of the California Penal Code); see
also ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.120 (Michie 1996) (prohibiting civil compromise for misdemeanors committed against
a spouse or former spouse, parent, child, grandchild, grandparent, one living in the same social unit residing in the
same dwelling, or one who is not a spouse or former spouse but one formerly in a spousal relationship with the
defendant); SENATE COMMITEE ON CRiMiNAL PROcEDuRE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 115, at 2 (Mar. 11, 1997)
(reporting a statement made by the bill's author that civil compromise fails to treat domestic violence as a crime,
sending a message to victims and abusers that domestic violence is not a serious crime, and that prohibiting
compromise will allow for the necessary intervention into and prevention of domestic violence); ASSEMBLY
COMM=E ON PUBLIC SAF'Y, COMMrr=E ANALYsS OF SB 97, at I (July 8, 1997) (reporting a statement made
by the bill's author that civil compromise can no longer be permitted in cases of domestic violence, elder abuse,
and child abuse because of the risk of undue influence by the abuser and because allowing compromise sends the
message that the abuse of people closest to us is not a serious crime).
25. See CAL PENAL CODE § 1377(f) (amended by Chapter 243) (eliminating civil compromise for
misdemeanors committed against elders in violation of California Penal Code § 368 or California Welfare and
Institutions Code § 15656); see also CAL. PENALCODE § 368(a) (West 1988) (prohibiting any person from willfully
causing or allowing any elder or dependent adult, knowing that the person is a dependent adult or elder, to suffer
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, under conditions which threaten death or great bodily injury); iUL
§ 368(a) (West 1988) (prohibiting, under conditions threatening great bodily injury or death, any person having the
care or custody of any elder from willfully causing or allowing the elder or dependent adult's person or health to
be injured, or willfully causing or allowing the dependent adult to be in a situation where his or her health or person
is endangered); id. § 368(b) (West 1988) (prohibiting any person from willfully causing or allowing any elder or
dependent adult, knowing that the person is a dependent adult or elder, to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or
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ban civil compromise in cases of abuse of dependent adults charged under the
provisions defining elder abuse and abuse of dependent adults. 26 Civil compromise
with a particular dependent adult, however, may be barred by the ban on com-
promise of domestic violence offenses, which includes abuse committed against
certain family members.' In any event, civil compromise is subject to the
limitations on the court's discretion regarding the appropriateness of civil com-
promise mentioned above.28 Finally, Chapter 243 bans civil compromise of
misdemeanor child abuse and violations of protective orders relating to minors.2"
mental suffering, under conditions other than those which threaten death or great bodily injury); id, (prohibiting,
under conditions other than those threatening great bodily injury or death, any person having the care or custody
of any elder from willfully causing or allowing the elder or dependent adult's person or health to be injured, or
willfully causing or allowing the dependent adult to be in a situation where his or her health is endangered); id. §
368(c) "West 1988) (prohibiting any caretaker of an elder or dependent adult from committing theft or
embezzlement of an amount greater than four hundred dollars); id. § 368(d) (West 1988) (defining "elder" as any
person 65 years of age or older); id. § 368(0 (West 1988) (defining "caretaker" as a person with the "care, custody,
or control of or who stands in a position of trust with, an elder or dependent adult"); CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE §
15656(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1997 ) (defining crimes against elders and dependent adults using language identical to
§ 368 of the California Penal Code); AsSEMBLYCOmmrrTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 97,
at I (July 8, 1997) (reporting the statement of the author that civil compromise sends the message that abuse of
those closest to us is not a serious crime, only a private matter that can be resolved with an apology or a payoff).
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1377(f) (enacted by Chapter 243) (prohibiting civil compromise of
misdemeanors committed against elders in violation of § 368 of the California Penal Code and § 15656 of the
California Welfare and Institutions Code); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 368(e) (West 1988) (defining "dependent
adult" as any person between the ages of 18 and 64 with physical or mental limitations that limit his or her ability
to do normal activities, or protect his or her rights, including an individual in a 24-hour health facility).
27. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1377(e) (amended by Chapter 243) (prohibiting civil compromise of
misdemeanors committed by or upon any family or household member described in § 6211 of the Califomia Family
Code or § 13700 of the California Penal Code); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211(f) (West 1994) (including within
the definition of domestic violence, abuse committed against any person related by consanguinity or affinity within
the second degree).
28. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing the abuse of discretion standard of review for
civil compromise cases).
29. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1377(g) (enacted by Chapter 243) (prohibiting civil compromise of
misdemeanors committed against a child under § 647.6 of the California Penal Code or § 11165.6 of the Califomia
Penal Code); id. § 647.6 (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting annoying or molesting children under the age of 18); id.
§ 11165.6 (West Supp. 1997) (defining "child abuse" as physical injury inflicted on a child other than through
accident; "sexual abuse of a child or any act or commission proscribed by § 273a" of the California Penal Code or
§ 273d of the California Penal Code; or neglect of a child or abuse of a child in out-of-home care); id. § 273a (West
Supp. 1997) (prohibiting willful cruelty or unjustifiable punishment of a child and unlawful corporal punishment
or injury to a child); id. § 1377(d) (amended by Chapter 243) (prohibiting compromise of cases involving a
violation ofa protective court order as described in § 273.6 and § 273.65 of the California Penal Code); id. § 273.65
(West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting intentional and knowing violations of restraining and protective orders relating to
minors adjudged to be dependent children of the juvenile court).
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HI. ELIMINATING CIVIL COMPROMISE IN DOMESTIC ABUSE SITUATIONS
A. Arguments For Eliminating Civil Compromise
Opponents of civil compromise in domestic violence cases argue that abusers
may take advantage of the reconciliation pattern that follows a battering incident?0
For example, victims of domestic violence often regret their decision to participate
in civil compromise because the cycle of abuse frequently continues--despite
assurances from the batterer.3 t Opponents of civil compromise also believe that civil
compromise sends the message to abusers and their victims that society does not
take abuse among people living together seriously when it allows the abuser to
escape without serious outside intervention.32
Proponents of Chapter 243 believe that these concerns relating to civil com-
promise will play a part in coercing or pressuring the victim into compromising
with the abuser when prosecution is more appropriate.33 Moreover, supporters of
Chapter 243 assert that in cases of child and elder abuse, where the law is, in part,
designed to protect victims who are unable to make informed decisions, the victim
is often not truly capable of condoning crimes committed upon them.34 And if it
30. See ASSEMBLYCOMMITI'EE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 115, at 3 (Apr. 1, 1997)
(asserting that civil compromise deprives society of the opportunity to intervene and break the cycle of violence
by allowing an abuser to take advantage of the "loving reconciliation" period when the woman is especially
vulnerable to the abuser's attempts to win her back while trying to isolate the couple from outside intervention).
31. See Judges Accused of Leniency in Beatings, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., supra note 12, at A3 (reporting
the case of a woman battered by her drunken boyfriend who wanted him to receive treatment rather than go to jail,
who accepted a civil compromise that included treatment, but who was again beaten by the boyfriend); id.
(reporting that the woman regretted that she had accepted the compromise, saying that she would never have
accepted such a solution if a stranger had beaten her, and quoting the victim as saying that women are vulnerable
when someone they love beats them).
32. See ASSEMBLY COMMirrEE ON PuBLtC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 115, at 3 (Apr. 1, 1997)
(stating that civil compromise treats domestic violence as a private issue reinforcing the batterer's belief that the
abuse is not an issue of public concern, possibly leading the abuser to think he may continue with impunity, and
it also tells the woman, at a time when her self-esteem is damaged and she possibly believes that she is the cause
of the abuse, that society will not intervene and that she does not merit society's attention); see also Greg Lucas,
Accused Batterers Can't Pay to Erase Charges Under New Law, S.F. CHRON., June 10, 1997, at A20 (stating that
advocacy groups argue that allowing civil compromise creates a perception that domestic violence is not a serious
crime).
33. See ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 97, at I (July 8, 1997)
(stating the bill author's assertion that given the condition of the victim or the relation between the abuser and the
victim in cases of child abuse, elder abuse, and domestic violence, that such victims may be subject to undue
influence by the to abuser into civil compromise); ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrI'EE
ANALYSIS OF SB 115, at 3 (Apr. 1, 1997) (stating that proponents feared abusers could be coercing their victims
into compromising); see also Molly Dickinson Velick, Mandatory Reporting Statutes: A Necessary Yet
Underutilized Response to Elder Abuse, 3 ELDER L.J. 165, 173-75 (1995) (stating that elder abuse may be
underreported because victims may be too ashamed to admit that their loved ones or family members abuse them,
because victims may fear reprisals, or because victims are often the ones helping care for the abuser, the victims
often fear leaving the abuser without adequate care); id. at 175 (stating that families try to stick together both when
the victim relies on the abuser for care and when the abuser relies on the victim for care).
34. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 97, at 3 (July 8, 1997).
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appears to the abuser that the victim does not have the option to prevent the
prosecution from continuing by compromising, then the victim may be shielded
from blame and coercive pressure by the abuser to compromise.
35
B. Arguments For Not Eliminating Civil Compromise
Opponents of Chapter 243 point out that eliminating civil compromise in
domestic violence cases limits the court's options in fashioning a solution appro-
priate to the particular case.36 Civil compromise is an especially important option
in hard to prove cases because without it abuse victims may be left with no remedy
at all.37
Eliminating civil compromise in abuse cases is subject to the same criticism
laid upon "no-drop" policies that argue such policies are paternalistic. 38 Opponents
of Chapter 243 contend, for example, that the effect of Chapter 243 would result in
a competent adult not being able to compromise a case involving the theft of a small
35. See Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1540
(1993) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (asserting that "no-drop" policies work best when prosecutors use
subpoenas for both cooperative and uncooperative victims because the victim is shielded from blame and the
pressure to drop charges when it appears to the abuser that the victim is being compelled to testify).
36. See Fernandez, supra note 8, at A8 (reporting Senator Kopp's position which recognized the seriousness
of the crime of domestic abuse but who opposed SB 115 as being inconsistent with the principle of judicial dis-
cretion, and that he would oppose the bill until convinced that judges were abusing their discretion in approving
civil compromises too frequently and unjustifiably). But see ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COM-
M TrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 97, at 4 (July 8, 1997) (stating that court discretion over civil compromise in domestic
violence cases was so abused that SB 115 was passed by the Legislature).
37. See ASSEMBLY COMMI-EE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMnITEE ANALYSiS OFSB 115, at 3 (Apr. 1, 1997)
(stating opposition's objection to SB 115 that civil compromise is best used in cases that would be hard to
prosecute); see also Fernandez, supra note 8, at A5 (reporting judges' statements at a hearing regarding a proposed
resolution of the San Francisco County Board of Supervisors to disapprove use of civil compromise in domestic
violence cases as saying that proposal infringes on judicial independence and that a blanket refusal to grant civil
compromise would result in more acquittals or outright dismissals); Lucas, supra note 12, at A17 (quoting a
legislative advocate for the California Public Defenders Association as saying that if compromise is banned victims
will receive no remedy when a weak case ends in acquittal and saying that civil compromise is most often used in
the least threatening cases).
38. See Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1541 (describing criticism of "no-drop" policies which
claim that such policies are paternalistic and erosive of the victim's self-esteem because they take the control over
the situation and the decision of whether or not there will be a prosecution away from the victim); see also Corsilles,
supra note 15, at 876 (suggesting that by denying the victim the ability to make choices for herself and family and
to assess the risks herself, "no-drop" policies may further erode self-esteem and attempts at empowerment).
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amount of money by a housekeeper.39 A practical effect of taking this discretion
away from victims could be that they will be more reluctant to call the police in the
first place if they believe that arrest will automatically lead to prosecution. 4°
IV. CONCLUSION
The elimination of civil compromise in domestic abuse cases continues a series
of actions designed to strengthen the law regarding domestic abuse.4' Specifically,
Chapter 243 continues a trend in bringing domestic violence cases to formal and
public adjudication.42 Chapter 243 reinforces the message that domestic violence
is not just a private matter, but also a matter of great public concern.43 Though
Chapter 243 limits courts' flexibility, the particular danger to victims and society
posed by these crimes and the unseen pressure on victims to compromise provides
substantial justification for a clear rule limiting the use of civil compromise.
39. See SENATE FLOOR, ANALYSIS OF SB 97, at 4 (Mar. 12, 1997) (stating that given the definiton of
"caretaker," those that can be prosecuted under § 368 of the Penal Code could include a trusted housekeeper); see
also CAL PENAL CODE § 368(0 (West 1988) (defining "caretaker" as a person with the "care, custody, or control
of or who stands in a position of trust with, an elder or dependent adult").
40. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1865 (1996) (describing how policies, such as issuing subpoenas, which
force the victim into a process over which she has no control, can have the effect of re-victimizing the victim and
cause her to be reluctant to call for police protection).
41. See supra notes 16-17 (discussing recent changes in California law regarding domestic abuse).
42. See supra notes 16-17 (discussing efforts in California to bring domestic abuse cases to formal adjudi-
cation).
43. See supra note 32 (discussing the importance of treating abuse in the home as a public rather than
private matter).
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Recent Domestic Violence Legislation: Attempting to End
the Abuse
Kimberly Jean Wedding
Code Sections Affected
Penal Code § 1050 (amended).
SB 215 (Alpert); 1997 STAT. Ch. 69
Penal Code § 136.2 (amended).
AB 340 (Alby); 1997 STAT. Ch. 48
I. INTRODUCTION
"I know of no more urgent issue in our society than the reduction of family
violence. It is pervasive .... It goes to the very core of the humanity we
wish to preserve."'
The prevalence of domestic violence in the state of California has prompted the
California Legislature to pass legislation aimed at preventing the occurrence of
domestic violence and at providing legal remedies to victims in their endeavors to
end the abuse. 2 Examples of such legislation are the Domestic Violence Prevention
Act3 and the Law Enforcement Response to Domestic Violence Act.4 However,
victims, law enforcement, courts, and district attorneys continue to face problems
regarding the enforcement of restraining orders and the successful prosecution of
1. Elaine Herscher, New Local Councils Help Victims of Family Violence; All Counties in Callfornia
Participating, S.F. CHRON., June 10, 1995, at AI5 (quoting Santa Clara County Juvenile Court Judge Leonard
Edwards speaking at the Alameda County Family Violence Council on June 8, 1995).
2. See CAL. FAMILY CODE § 6220 (Vest 1994) (stating that the purpose of the Domestic Violence
Prevention Act is "to prevent the recurrence of acts of violence and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation
of persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of
the causes of the violence").
3. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 219, sec. 154, at 1383-90 (West) (enacting the Domestic Violence Prevention
Act).
4. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1609, see. 3, at 1700 (West) (enacting the Law Enforcement Response to Domestic
Violence Act).
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offenders.' The existence of these problems encouraged the Legislature to enact
Chapters 48 and 69.'
Chapter 48 declares that a criminal restraining order and its provisions will be
given precedence over any conflicting civil restraining order that has been issued
for or against the same defendant.7 Chapter 69 allows "good cause" for a
continuance to be automatically met when the prosecutor requests a continuance in
a domestic violence case.8 Both Chapters attempt to reduce the prevalence of family
violence by eliminating those problems which hinder the enforcement of restraining
orders and the successful prosecution of domestic violence cases.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Chapter 48
Victims of domestic violence have been provided various methods in which
they may be awarded a restraining or protective order by the courts.9 However,
criminal and civil courts rarely confer with one another when issuing restraining
orders.10 For example, an order filed by a civil court judge in a divorce case may
contain restrictions, such as the distance that a defendant must keep from the victim
and the children, that will differ from those restrictions in a restraining order issued
by a criminal judge hearing a domestic violence case." These conflicting restraining
orders cause confusion for law enforcement officers who are called upon to enforce
5. See Herscher, supra note 1, at A15 (reporting that confusion in the law "is making it difficult for
domestic violence victims to get help and in some cases inadvertently contributing to the danger they face"); see
also id. (noting that civil and criminal courts do not consult one another when issuing restraining or protective
orders, which often will conflict with one another); SENATE LOOp ANALYSIS, ANALYSIS OFAB 340, at 2 (June 16,
1997) (explaining that conflicting orders in domestic violence cases lead to "mistakes, lack of law enforcement,
unjust arrest, and violence"),
6. See ASSEMBLYCOMMITEEoNPUBLICSAFETY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 215, at 1 (June 24, 1997)
(stating that SB 215 "will facilitate the vertical prosecutions of such cases, mandated by spousal abuser prosecution
program grants"); ASSEMBLY CoMMrrrE ON JUDICIARY, COMMnm'E ANALYSIS OF AB 340, at 1 (May 7, 1997)
(noting that, while the Legislature has offered many forms of protective and restraining orders to domestic violence
victims, this bill is needed to clarify the priority of the orders).
7. CAL.PENALCODE§ 136.2(h)(2) (enactedby Chapter48) (stating thatwhen thedefendantis chargedwith
domestic violence crime, "a restraining order or protective order against the defendant issued by the criminal court
in that case has precedent over any other outstanding order against the defendant").
8. Id. § 1050(g) (amended by Chapter 69).
9. Id. § 136.2 (amended by Chapter 48); see CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320 (West 1994) (enjoining specific acts
of abuse); see also id. § 6321 (West 1994) (excluding a person from a dwelling); id. § 6322 (West 1994) (enjoining
other specified behavior); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West Supp. 1997) (allowing a person who has suffered
harassment to seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction prohibiting harassment).
10. See ASSEMBLY COMMTrrEEON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrFrEEANALYSIS OF AB 340, at 1 (Apr. 1, 1997)
(noting that "courts often issue orders and fashion dispositions with little communication with other involved courts
and without knowledge of existing court orders"); see also Herscher, supra note 1, at A15 (reporting that criminal
and civil courts in Alameda County do not discuss orders that they issue which involve the same parties).
11. Herscher, supra note 1, at AI5.
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them because police officers must choose which restraining order to enforce without
any guidance.' 2 The resulting confusion leaves many victims without protection.,I
Chapter 48 resolves this confusion by declaring that any restraining or
protective order issued by a criminal court hearing a domestic violence case has
precedence over any other outstanding court order against the same defendant.' 4
Therefore, when police officers are called to a situation where they encounter con-
flicting civil and criminal restraining orders, Chapter 48 requires them to enforce
the criminal order. 5
B. Chapter 69
California law reflects the long standing policy that criminal proceedings be
quickly disposed of in order to avoid adverse consequences to the People of
California and the accused.' 6 Specifically, the Legislature recognizes that con-
tinuances in criminal proceedings lead to extended incarceration of defendants and
delay victims' interests in the speedy resolution of the cases.'7 Accordingly,
California law requires a finding that there be "good cause" before a continuance
will be granted.' 8 The courts are entitled to consider the availability of witnesses,
including peace officers, and any prior commitments on their part when determining
whether or not there is sufficient good cause to grant the continuance.' 9 In 1987, the
Legislature expanded the definition of good cause by designating that cases invol-
ving sexual abuse, sexual assault, or child abuse automatically meet the requirement
of good cause and shall be granted a continuance when the prosecuting attorney
cannot be in court because he or she has another trial, preliminary hearing, or
12. See id. (reporting that police officers are often called to the scene of a domestic violence situation and
are often unable to make sense of the numerous court orders).
13. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEEON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 340, at I (Apr. 1, 1997)
(stating that restraining orders issued by different courts that differ from one another leave law enforcement in the
position of having to choose one over the other); see also Herscher, supra note 1. at AIS (quoting psychologist
Mary Duryee, who stated that "the police department is supposed to make sense of this stuff when they get a call
on Saturday night" and should not leave the victim exposed to further abuse); SENATE FLOOR, AvALYSiS oFAB 340,
at 2 (June 16, 1997) (explaining that the conflicting orders "place law enforcement in the field with the position of
giving one valid order preference over another").
14. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 136.2 (amended by Chapter 48).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 1050(a) (West 1994); see Harris v. Municipal Court, 209 Cal. 55, 61, 285 P. 699, 701 (1930)
(reflecting the principle that there is public concern regarding the disposition of criminal cases and that, therefore.
it is the duty of the courts and prosecutors to ensure the speedy disposition of those cases).
17. CAL. PENALCODE § 1050(a) (West 1994).
18. Id. § 1050(e) (West 1994).
19. Id. § 1050(g) (West 1994) (amended by Chapter 69); see 5 B.E. WITKIN & NORNMAN L. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORN A CRIMINALLAWTrial § 2501 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing that although the statute provides no definition
of "good cause," the courts are permitted to consider certain specified factors, such as the "general convenience and
prior commitments of all witnesses, including peace officers").
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motion being heard in another court.2° Proponents of this legislation argued that
when the prosecuting attorney's schedule was not considered by the courts in deter-
mining whether or not to grant the continuance, the court would require that another
prosecutor handle the case for the absent prosecutor or the case would be re-
assigned." This would require the victim to retell the intimate details of the sexual
abuse, assault, or child abuse to the new prosecutor.22 It was the special nature of
the crime of sexual abuse and child abuse that prompted the Legislature to provide
this designation of automatic good cause.2
Those who work in the domestic violence prevention field, such as social
workers, psychologists, and prosecutors, argue that domestic violence victims
should be awarded the same consideration as sexual assault and child abuse victims
when prosecutors request continuances.24 Many of the criticisms concern the assign-
ment of new prosecutors to the case when a continuance is not granted2s They
argue that domestic violence victims have similar stories of abuse which, if they are
required to tell the story again to a new prosecutor, would entail having to re-live
the days, months, or years of abuse they suffered at the hands of their abuser.26 In
addition, they claim that the ability to successfully prosecute the offender decreases
because a new prosecutor, usually unfamiliar with the case, will be assigned to
cover for the absent prosecutor and will have had little time to prepare.27
In response to calls for reform by those in the domestic violence prevention
field, the Legislature has struggled with ways to improve the apprehension and
prosecution of domestic violence offenders. 28 Chapter 69 attempts to facilitate the
prosecution of domestic violence offenders by awarding domestic violence cases
20. 1987 Cal. Stat. Ch. 461, sec. 3, at 1700 (West) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1050(g)) (declaring that
"good cause" includes, but is not limited to, those cases involving allegations of sexual assault/abuse or child
abuse).
21. See ASSEMBLY COMMrTEE ONPUBLtC SAFETY, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 215, at 3 (June 24, 1997)
(presenting the arguments of proponents of SB 215, who argue that the reasoning behind the passage of SB 215
is identical to the position held by proponents of the 1987 amendment to Cal. Penal Code § 1050).
22. See id at 2 (describing the experience that many sexual and child abuse victims face when their cases
are continually reassigned to new prosecutors).
23. See id. (noting that after recognizing the difficulty that many sexual abuse victims face while their cases
are proceeding through the criminal justice system, the Legislature enacted Penal Code § 1050(g) which allows a
continuance to be granted for good cause when the prosecutor is assigned to a sexual assault/child abuse case).
24. See id. at 4 (listing the supporters of SB 215, who favor the same system of granting continuances in
domestic violence cases as is currently in use with sexual and child abuse cases).
25. Id. at 4.
26. See id. at 3 (providing arguments by supporters of SB 215, who contend that without this legislation,
victims will "have to tell his or her very personal story again and again," as well as build a rapport with each new
prosecutor, which is difficult to do).
27. See id. at 2 (stating that "prosecutors stand a greater chance of getting a conviction when vertical
prosecution methods are used").
28. See Mary Lynne Vellinga, Legislature Faces Push for Stronger Domestic Violence Laws, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Mar. 23, 1997, at A25 (providing a summary of the legislation pending in both houses that focuses on
preventing and prosecuting domestic violence after the legislature received criticism from advocates for victims
of domestic violence).
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the same consideration as sexual assault and child abuse cases in the granting of
continuances. 29 Specifically, it allows the prosecuting attorney's schedule conflicts
to constitute sufficient good cause for a continuance when the crime being
prosecuted involves a domestic violence offense.
30
M. PRACrICALITY OF CHAPTERs 48 AND 69
Chapter 48, which designates that criminal restraining orders have precedence
over any conflicting civil orders, reflects a commonly held view that criminal
actions take precedence over civil actions. 3t Criminal cases are commonly awarded
precedence over civil cases in the setting of date and time for trial.32 For example,
in Quincy, Massachusetts, the courts classify domestic violence cases "as priority
over other civil matters. 33 In the Quincy courts, if a domestic violence victim is not
able to appear at a special domestic violence restraining order session, the judges
will hear the victims as soon as the restraining order request is filed.' Many times
this will occur ahead of other pending cases, civil or criminal, already before the
judge?5 Not only does this system provide priority to criminal cases over civil
actions, but it also affords a higher preference to criminal actions involving
domestic violence.
Chapter 69 furthers the goal of successfully prosecuting domestic violence
offenders by ensuring the ability of prosecutors to handle the cases "vertically."
3 6
Vertical prosecution refers to a situation "where one attorney is assigned to a case
from be ginning to end, to proceed intact., 37 Vertical prosecution avoids the use of
an "assembly line" method, where different prosecutors are assigned to manage the
same case at the various stages of prosecution.3 8 This leads to prosecutors being
29. See ASSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSTS OF SB 215, at 2 (June 24,1997)
(stating that SB 215 would grant continuances in domestic violence cases in a manner similar to that alreMdy in
effect for sexual and child abuse cases).
30. CAL PENAL CODE § 1050(g) (amended by Chapter 69).
31. See 5 B.E. Wr KIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW Trial § 2449 (2d ed, 1989 &
Supp. 1997) (discussing the public policy behind requiring the prompt disposition of criminal cases before any civil
matters or proceedings).
32. CAL. PENALCODE § 1050(a) (West 1994).
33. Elena Salzman, Note, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model
Legal Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REV. 329, 338 (1994); see id. (suggesting that
the Quincy Program is very successful because it "rests on three fundamental concepts: integration, communication,
and prioritization of domestic violence issues").
34. See id. at 342 (describing the procedure set up by the Quincy court system which will "expedite
domestic violence hearings," and providing alternatives to the special sessions if needed).
35. Id.
36. ASSEMBLYCOMMITrEE ONPBLICSAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS oF SB 215, at 1 (June 24, 1997).
37. Id. at 2.
38. See Ted Appel, Anti-Gang Prosecution Unit Formed, U.P.I., Mar. 22, 1988 (reporting how gang-related
prosecutions were handled prior to the use of the vertical prosecution strategy); see also Elaine Tassy, Seeing It
Through; Prosecutors To Be Assigned For Duration of Case To Give Abuse Victims Support, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
21,1993, at B3 (noting that before vertical prosecution, "domestic violence victims usually had different attorneys
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unfamiliar with the progression of the case and leaves victims to explain their story
each time a new prosecutor is assigned.39
The concept of vertical prosecution is being used to improve the conviction rate
of many crimes, including statutory rape,' narcotics violations, 4' robberies and
burglaries,42 and gang-related crimes.43 Interestingly, the move towards vertical
prosecution is now being applied by the judicial branch in which courts are
assigning one judge to handle an entire case from beginning to end.44
The use of vertical prosecution has only recently been applied to spousal abuse
and domestic violence cases.45 However, even with its limited and short use, the Los
Angeles County District Attorney is reporting an 88% conviction rate as a result of
using the vertical prosecution method.' The Los Angeles County District Attorney
contends that Chapter 69 will further its ability to ensure vertical prosecution in
domestic violence cases because it allows the courts to consider the prosecutor's
for the various stages of the judicial process-filing, preliminary hearings, and prosecution").
39. See Tassy, supra note 38, at B3 (stating that "victims... end up sitting in courtrooms with prosecutors
who had just been handed this case five minutes beforehand," and that the use of vertical prosecution will allow
one attorney to become particularly familiar with the victim's case).
40. See Tony Perry, Getting Tough On Teenage Pregnancies; Laws: With the Failure of Education and
Counseling Programs, Governor Boosts Prosecution of Men Who Have Sex With Underage Girls, L.A. TIMbS, Jan.
7, 1996, at A3 (reporting that California Governor Pete Wilson began a new program which uses vertical
prosecution to improve the "enforcement of laws against men having sex with underage girls").
41. See Dwayne Bray, ProsecutorsAlso TargetSmall-lTime Meth Dealers; Crime: Authorities Cite Alarming
Rise in Use of the Drug and Seek Approval to Earmark Block Grant Funds to Combat the Increase, L.A. TIMES,
June 27, 1995, at B I (stating that local governments are planning to target "the lowest level dealers of the drug with
high-priority prosecutions" implementing the vertical prosecution concept for methamphetamine dealers).
42. See Tom Ragan, Community News Focus: Countywide; D.A. Seeks $280,000 to Aid Prosecutions, L.A.
TIMES, June 1,1995, at B2 (describing an application filed by the Orange County District Attorney requesting funds
to create a new vertical prosecution unit, consisting of two assistant district attorneys and one investigator, to track
and prosecute robbery and burglary suspects).
43. See Jerry Hicks, Prosecutor Brings Experience to Gang Detail; Crime: Brent V Romney Heads the
D.A.'s Gang Unit After Having Specialized in Such Cases-Considered the Toughest in the Office, L.A. TIMES,
May 20, 1990, at B6 (reporting that the vertical prosecution concept is an important tool in reducing gang-related
violence in the city).
44. See Grace Karpa, Officials Give Nod To Revamp of Courts, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 6, 1996, at N1
(observing that Placer County courts will be adopting a vertical prosecution strategy in hopes of improving the court
system and the speedy resolution of cases).
45. See Pamela M. Macktaz, Domestic Violence: A View From the Bench, 69 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISsUES 37, 42 (1995) (noting that "the concept of vertical prosecution is one of the new responses to domestic
violence"); see also Jean Merl, Spousal Abuse Prosecution Unit To Be Expanded; Law: The Same Staff Members
Who File Charges Will Now Be Able To See Case Through To Resolution, City Attorney Says, Increasing the
Likelihood of Convictions; He Names a Top Deputy To Head the Effort, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at B I (reporting
that a new domestic violence prosecution team formed in the District Attorney's Office will adopt the use of a
vertical prosecution strategy to improve the rate of domestic violence convictions).
46. See Donna Wills, Symposium: Mandatory Prosecution in Domestic Violence Cases: Domestic Violence:
The Case For Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J 173, 180 n.28 (1997) (stating the success that the
Los Angeles County District Attorney has had in prosecuting domestic violence cases since using vertical
prosecution).
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calendar, which is often consumed with other domestic violence cases, on a motion
for a continuance.
47
However, opponents to Chapter 69 argue that a continuance should be granted
on a case-by-case basis, not because of the crime charged or the prosecutor's
calendar conflicts.43 In addition, opponents contend that vertical prosecution often
disrupts the courts because of the many scheduling conflicts, and they advocate the
assignment of one prosecutor per courtroom. 49 However, proponents argue that the
benefits of vertical prosecution are numerous and that its use is necessary to further
the legislative policy of treating domestic violence victims with "fairness and
sensitivity."50
IV. CONCLUSION
Chapters 48 and 69 will enable the criminal justice system to treat victims of
domestic violence with the fairness and sensitivity advocated by the California
Legislature. By ensuring the protection of victims through the enforcement of
criminal restraining orders over any conflicting civil order' and encouraging the
victims' cooperation in courts by supporting the use of the vertical prosecution
through the granting of automatic good cause in domestic violence cases,52 perhaps
these laws will effectuate a reduction in the instances of family violence long
awaited by victims.
47. See ASSEMBLY COMM1rEE ON PUBLC SAFETY, COMMMTEEANALYSIS OFSB 215, at 3 (June 24,1997)
(noting that the change that Chapter 69 effectuates will enable the prosecutor to ensure that the case will be handled
vertically and "would give prosecutors another tool to help break the cycle of violence in California").
48. See id. (reflecting the position of Chapter 69 opponents, the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice,
who argue that the judge must consider other interests when deciding to grant a motion for a continuance, such as
whether or not the defendant is in custody).
49. See John C. Kuehner, Prosecutor, Foe Sharply Different, THE PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 7, 1996, at lB
(reporting comments made by a candidate for district attorney who disagrees with the use of vertical prosecution,
except in drug and sex offense cases, because the prosecutor disrupts the court with his or her scheduling conflicts
because of cases in other courtrooms).
50. See ASSEMBLYCOMM rrEONPUBLICSAFETY.COMMMTIEEANALYSISOpSB 215, at3 (June 24,1997)
(observing that vertical prosecution has "resulted in higher conviction rates, victims who are more involved and
satisfied with the results of the trial, and a more efficient use of scarce resources").
51. See supra Part Il (discussing that Chapter 49 will better enable police officers to protect violence victims
because they will know which one of the many restraining or protective orders should be enforced).
52. See supra Part III (addressing the importance of vertical prosecution in attaining convictions and finding
that a court's consideration of a prosecutor's time schedule when deciding whether to grant a continuance will
encourage the use of vertical prosecution).
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